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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Ray Donald Loy is currently serving a 33-month term of 
imprisonment following his conviction for receiving and 
possessing child pornography. After being r eleased from 
prison, he will be required to serve thr ee years of 
supervised release, subject to several special conditions, 
two of which are at issue in this appeal. Thefirst condition 
prohibits Loy from possessing "all for ms of pornography, 
including legal adult pornography." The second condition 
bars Loy from having unsupervised contact with minor 
children, and further specifies that the r equisite 
supervision must come from someone other than his wife. 
Loy challenges these conditions, arguing that the 
pornography condition is vague and overbr oad, and that 
the condition restricting contact with minors is not only 
vague and unsupported by the record, but could also 
potentially inhibit Loy's ability to have and raise his own 
children, in violation of his rights of pr ocreation and 
familial integrity. 
 
At the threshold, we must address the government's 
contention that Loy's challenge to the pornography 
condition should not be addressed befor e an attempt has 
been made to enforce its terms. W e disagree, holding that 
the challenge is properly made at this time. W e therefore 
turn to the merits of Loy's arguments, and conclude that 
the prohibition on pornography is unconstitutionally vague 
because it fails to provide any method for Loy or his 
probation officer to distinguish between those items that 
are merely titillating and those items that are 
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"pornographic"; nor, in fact, does the prohibition even 
provide any guidance as to whether the r estriction extends 
only to visual materials, or whether purely textual works 
and sound recordings fall within its scope. Therefore, we 
vacate this condition and remand to the District Court so 
that it may, if it so chooses, impose a new condition in 
accordance with the standards we set forth. 
 
As for the restriction on contact with minors, we 
conclude that, although the condition might ar guably 
extend to Loy's own (infant) children should he sire any 
upon his release from prison and befor e the three-year term 
of supervised release ends, given the lack of evidence to 
suggest that such an unlikely interpretation was intended 
by the District Court (and the constitutional questions that 
such an interpretation would raise), we will construe this 
condition not to extend to any children that Loy might have 
for the brief period of time that would be involved. We also 
construe the condition not to extend to accidental or 
unavoidable contact with children, such as might occur in 
public arenas. So construed, we uphold the condition as 
written and find that it comports with statutory and 
constitutional requirements. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
This is the second time Loy has asked us to r eview the 
special conditions imposed on his supervised r elease. The 
following facts are taken largely verbatim from our decision 
in Loy's first appeal. See United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 
360, 362-64 (3d Cir. 1999). Of course, we have 
supplemented our previous factual discussion as necessary 
to reflect developments that have occurr ed in the interim. 
 
In 1997, the United States Postal Inspection Service and 
the Pennsylvania State Attorney General's Office conducted 
a joint undercover child pornography investigation. As part 
of that investigation, Special Agent Dave Guzy of the 
Attorney General's Office placed an advertisement in a 
sexually explicit magazine that, in a roundabout way, 
invited readers to trade pornographic materials involving 
children. The advertisement directed inter ested parties to 
respond in writing to Postal Inspector Thomas Kochman, 
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although Kochman's affiliation with the Inspection Service 
obviously was not disclosed. On March 6, 1997, Ray 
Donald Loy wrote to Kochman indicating that he and his 
wife, Maria, both collected child pornography, and 
expressing an interest in trading tapes. Loy stated that if 
Kochman was serious about trading, he should call Loy so 
that they could discuss it over the telephone. 
 
On March 17, 1997, Kochman monitored and r ecorded a 
call placed by Guzy to Loy. During that conversation, Loy 
gave detailed descriptions of some of the tapes in his 
collection, and told Guzy that he could "put together" tapes 
for trading. He also represented that he traded with many 
people and offered to give Guzy their names. Loy described 
how he had produced videos by hiding a camcor der in his 
bag and filming up the skirts of young girls as they rode the 
escalators at a mall, and, in the course of the conversation, 
Loy specified that he was interested in r eceiving material 
involving girls ranging from age eight to age thirteen. He 
specifically requested that Guzy send him a tape of girls 
between the ages of eight and ten in a bathtub ("Bath Time 
video"), which Guzy agreed to do. On April 28, 1997, 
Kochman received a letter from Loy bearing the return 
address of R. Loy, P.O. Box 114, Langeloth, Pennsylvania 
15054. Again, Loy asked that the Bath Time video be sent 
to him. In exchange, Loy offered to send a video of twelve- 
and thirteen-year-old children engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct. 
 
On May 6, 1997, Postal Inspector Thomas Clinton 
delivered the package containing the Bath T ime video to 
Loy's post office box in Langeloth and observed Loy accept 
delivery of the package. Other agents maintained 
surveillance of Loy as he left the post office and returned 
home with the package. Loy was observed entering his 
residence with the package in his possession. Clinton then 
executed a previously obtained search warrant, seizing from 
Loy's residence the Bath Time videotape as well as another 
tape depicting child pornography, fifteen computer disks 
containing child pornography, fifty videocassettes, several 
pornographic magazines, a VCR, and a television set. 
Clinton also seized various letters describing Loy's 
solicitation of child pornography and his of fers to trade 
such materials. 
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In September 1998, Loy pled guilty to one count of 
knowingly receiving child pornography thr ough the United 
States mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(2). He had 
also been indicted on one count of violating S 2252(a)(4)(B). 
At the time, Section 2252(a)(4)(B) made it a crime to 
knowingly possess: (1) three or more items; (2) containing 
visual depictions; (3) produced using materials transported 
in interstate and foreign commerce; (4) if production of the 
materials involved the use of minors engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. See 18 U.S.C.A. S 2252(a)(4)(B) (West 
1997). Prior to entering his plea, Loy had challenged the 
S 2252(a)(4)(B) count by filing a motion to suppress the 
evidence on which it was based. The District Court denied 
the motion, and Loy then entered a conditional guilty plea 
on the S 2252(a)(4)(B) count that preserved his right to 
appeal from the denial. 
 
The District Court sentenced Loy to a 33-month ter m of 
imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised 
release. Additionally, the court imposed special conditions 
on Loy's supervised release, requiring him, inter alia, to 
undergo testing and treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, 
prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with 
minors, and forbidding him from possessing por nography of 
any type. Loy objected to these special conditions, arguing 
that they were not supported by the recor d and that they 
violated his fundamental rights. In the first appeal, we 
upheld the denial of Loy's motion to suppress and the 
condition requiring drug testing, but r emanded the case to 
the District Court to state its reasons why the remaining 
conditions had been imposed. See Loy, 191 F .3d at 369-71. 
 
Following remand, the District Court enter ed an order 
amending Loy's sentence to eliminate the condition that he 
undergo testing and treatment for alcohol abuse while on 
supervised release. The court then reimposed the 
conditions barring Loy from possessing por nography of any 
type, as well as from having any unsupervised contact with 
minors, adding the further requirement that any 
supervision must come from someone other than his wife. 
In reimposing these conditions, the court explained that 
because "it is sometimes impossible to dif ferentiate between 
children and adults in pornographic materials," the former 
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condition was necessary to protect childr en who are 
victimized in child pornography as well as to deter Loy from 
further criminal conduct or from attempting to obtain 
illegal child pornography. The latter condition was imposed 
to protect the minors with whom Loy might come into 
contact, and to deter Loy from attempting to cr eate 
"sexually explicit depictions of children." Loy now appeals 
for a second time, from an amended judgment of sentence 
entered in the District Court for the W estern District of 
Pennsylvania. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. S 3231, which grants the district courts 
jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United 
States. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's 
final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a). 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
A sentencing court's decision to impose conditions of 
supervised release is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 370 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing United States v. Crandon, 173 F .3d 122, 127 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 138 (1999)). A condition is 
within the court's discretion if two criteria are met. First, 
the condition must be reasonably related to the factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)-(D). Accordingly, in 
imposing conditions of supervised release, the sentencing 
court may consider: (1) the nature and cir cumstances of 
the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant; and (2) the need for the condition to deter future 
criminal conduct, protect the public, and pr ovide the 
defendant with necessary training, medical car e, or other 
correctional treatment. See 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)- 
(D); see also Loy, 191 F.3d at 370. 
 
Second, a condition must involve no greater deprivation 
of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
deterrence, public protection and/or corr ectional treatment 
for which it is imposed. See 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d)(2). Further, 
a condition that restricts fundamental rights must be 
"narrowly tailored and . . . dir ectly related to deterring [the 
defendant] and protecting the public." Crandon, 173 F.3d at 
128. 
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Before reaching the merits of Loy's claim, we must 
address the government's contention that Loy's challenge to 
the pornography proscription is not justiciable. The 
government advances several arguments on this score, 
implicating both the ripeness doctrine and standing 
considerations. Relying on United States v. Thomas, 198 
F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a prisoner's 
challenge to a condition of supervised release was 
premature because he would "not be subject to the 
condition for nearly a decade, during which time any 
number of events may occur that would make the condition 
irrelevant"), the government explains that, inter alia, an 
incarcerated prisoner may no longer have the same interest 
in engaging in the prohibited activity upon r elease from 
prison, and further, that vagueness challenges to conditions 
of supervised release are prematur e until those conditions 
have been interpreted by a probation officer. The 
government now asks that, "[a]s a matter of judicial policy," 
we refrain from entertaining due pr ocess challenges to 
conditions of supervised release prior to a violation of those 
conditions. Although the government avoids the words, it 
essentially asks us to hold that Loy's challenge fails to meet 
the prudential aspects of ripeness. 
 
Additionally, in recommending that we adopt a judicial 
policy of refusing to hear due process challenges to 
unenforced conditions of release, the government also relies 
on the standing requirements typically necessary to mount 
vagueness challenges to statutes that do not infringe 
constitutionally protected rights. Thus, citing Parker v. 
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the government has argued that 
because vagueness challenges may typically only be made 
in the context of particular purported violations, Loy must 
wait until he is facing revocation proceedings before he will 
be able to raise his claim. We will addr ess each of these 
arguments in turn, ultimately holding that Loy's claim is 
not only justiciable, but, in fact, consideration at this time 
promotes judicial efficiency and is in keeping with the 
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demonstrated congressional intent that sentences be 




In United States v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1981), 
this Court held that a defendant who failed to appeal a 
probation condition at the time it was enter ed against him 
was barred from lodging a facial attack on the condition as 
a defense in a revocation proceeding. See id. at 846-47. In 
so doing, we observed that "the federal courts have 
uniformly permitted defendants sentenced to probation to 
challenge the validity of their probation conditions on direct 
appeal." Id. at 846 n.16. In United States v. Ofchinick, 937 
F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1991), we reaffirmed Stine, holding that a 
challenge to a condition of supervised release mounted 
immediately after the sentence met the Article III test for 
ripeness. Our holding in Ofchinick was based in part on the 
fact that, if the defendant waited until revocation 
proceedings to challenge the condition, he would likely be 
found to have waived his right to object. See id. at 897. In 
that case, we characterized as "illogic[al]" the government's 
position that a probationer must risk incar ceration in order 
to challenge a condition. See id. at 897 n.5. 
 
Although helpful in guiding our approach to the issue, 
these cases do not explicitly address the "prudential" 
ripeness doctrine. That doctrine is intended to"prevent the 
courts . . . from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to 
protect the agencies from judicial inter ference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects 
felt in a concrete way." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 148 (1967). In determining whether a claim is ripe, a 
court must look at: (1) "the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration"; and (2) thefitness of the 
legal issue for judicial review. Id. at 149; see also Artway v. 
Attorney General of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1247 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In view of the government's contentions, we analyze this 
case in terms of these elements of the prudential ripeness 
doctrine. 
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a. Hardship to Parties 
 
The essence of Loy's claim is that not knowing the scope 
of the pornography proscription is, in itself, a hardship. He 
argues that because of the vagueness, he will not know 
what he can and cannot view. If, as the gover nment argues, 
he must wait until he is arrested to lear n whether or not he 
has violated the condition, the hardship to him is apparent. 
As we held in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. 
United States Department of Health & Human Services , 101 
F.3d 939 (3d Cir. 1996), the fact that a party may be forced 
to alter his behavior so as to avoid penalties under a 
potentially illegal regulation is, in itself, a hardship. In so 
doing, we opined that an argument to the contrary would 
be 
 
       like saying that an increase in the inter est rate charged 
       for late payments on a credit card pr esents no 
       hardship to the customer because the customer has 
       not yet made a delayed payment under the new and 
       higher interest rate. We disagree with that premise. 
       Instead, we think it more likely that the customer will 
       have to change his behavior at the time he is infor med 
       of the rate hike in order to avoid the risk of having to 
       pay the higher interest rate and hence will suf fer a 
       direct hardship at the time of the rate hike. The fact 
       that the new, higher interest rate is a contingent future 
       charge does not preclude it from causing harm to the 
       party at the time it is put into place. 
 
Id. at 946. 
 
In addition, the government's blanket r equirement that 
Loy face revocation proceedings befor e being permitted to 
challenge his conditions of release is at odds with the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Stef fel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452 (1974), where the Court stated that "it is not 
necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual 
arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute 
that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional 
rights." Id. at 459. 
 
b. Fitness for Judicial Review 
 
An examination of the "fitness for judicial r eview" of a 
particular claim requires that a court look at the nature of 
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the question presented. Therefore, we will examine 
"whether or not the question is purely legal and easy to 
resolve." Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. W elfare v. United States 
Health & Human Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 1996). 
As we have said, "[t]he more that the question presented is 
purely one of law, and the less that additional facts will aid 
the court in its inquiry, the more likely the issue is to be 
ripe, and vice-versa." Artway v. Attor ney General of N.J., 81 
F.3d 1235, 1249 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
In this case, the question is purely one of law: whether 
the pornography proscription is unconstitutionally vague 
and does not provide Loy with sufficient notice of what he 
may do. Nothing about this contention will change between 
now and the time when he is released fr om prison. The 
government would prefer that we addr ess Loy's challenge in 
the context of a particular magazine or other publication 
(an argument that has the perverse quality of asking us to 
refuse to rule on Loy's vagueness challenge because the 
condition is too vague to analyze). Although such 
contextual grounding would indeed allow us to determine 
whether or not the particular publication at issue fell within 
the condition, it would not in any way assist in the more 
general analysis of whether the condition pr ovides Loy with 
sufficient warning to "know what is pr ohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly" in his day-to-day activities. Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The 
government's approach would have Loy discover the 
meaning of his supervised release condition only under 
continual threat of reimprisonment, in sequential hearings 
before the court. Such an exercise is not necessary, nor will 
it clarify the issues. 
 
c. Congressional Intent 
 
In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court held that 
congressional intent is an important component of the 
prudential ripeness inquiry. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1967). The legislative history of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 evidences Congr ess's 
intention that direct appellate review be the preferred 
method of reviewing a district court's sentence. See S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 151 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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3182, 3334 (noting, in the context of a discussion of 
procedures for direct appellate r eview of sentences, that 
"most Western nations . . . consider review at the behest of 
either the defendant or the public to be a fundamental 
precept of a rational sentencing system, and the Committee 
considers it to be a critical part of the foundation for the 
bill's sentencing structure"); id. at 154, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3337 ("The Committee intends that a 
sentence be subject to modification through the appellate 
process. . . ."). Section 3742 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code, which allows for appellate review of sentences, was 
added in 1984 as part of the congressional scheme to 
ensure greater uniformity in sentencing. See S. Rep. No. 
98-225, at 150, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3333. 
This change from the previous regime, which provided for 
no such review, demonstrates the extent to which Congress 
felt that the appellate process was an integral part of the 
formulation of the sentence. Cf. id. at 151, reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334 ("Appellate review of sentences 
is essential to assure that the guidelines ar e applied 
properly and to provide case law development of the 
appropriate reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines. 
This, in turn, will assist the Sentencing Commission in 
refining the sentencing guidelines. . . ."). Thus, the 
legislative history of the current sentencing scheme 
demonstrates Congress's intention that appellate courts 
consider the legality of conditions of supervised r elease at 
the time of their imposition, rather than only in the context 




The government alternatively contends that Loy does not 
have standing to raise his claim, on the ground that "[o]ne 
to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not 
successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 756 (1974). The government submits that Loy 
cannot be heard until the condition has been applied to his 
specific conduct. However, there ar e crucial differences 
between the context in which Loy presents his challenge 
and the contexts in which the traditional standing 
requirements for vagueness challenges wer e developed. 
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A typical vagueness challenge is brought as a defense to 
a criminal charge, and can only be raised by a defendant 
whose own conduct arguably did not fall within the terms 
of the statute, thus allowing the defendant to claim that the 
lack of fair notice led to a deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy 
Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963) ("Void for 
vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should 
not attach where one could not reasonably understand that 
his contemplated conduct is proscribed. In determining the 
sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be 
examined in light of the conduct with which a defendant is 
charged." (citations omitted)). A defendant whose conduct is 
at the "core" of the activities clearly covered by the statute's 
terms may only raise a vagueness defense if the statute is 
one that is likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally 
protected conduct. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 
544, 550 (1975) ("It is well established that vagueness 
challenges to statutes which do not involve First 
Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the 
facts of the case at hand.").1Vagueness claims are therefore 
subject to different standing requir ements depending on 
the nature of the statute or rule under attack. 2 
 
As a convicted felon sentenced to a term of supervised 
release, Loy's constitutional rights do not have the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983) (holding 
that facial vagueness challenges are per missible where "a law reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct" (citation 
omitted)); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 494-95 (1982) (noting that, if a statute "implicates no 
constitutionally protected conduct," a pr eenforcement challenge can 
succeed on vagueness grounds only if the statute is "impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 
427 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1976) ("[I]f the statute's deterrent effect on 
legitimate 
expression" is "real and substantial," parties may challenge the statute 
"even though there is no uncertainty about the impact . . . on their own 
rights."). 
 
2. When a statute is vague and arguably involves protected conduct, 
vagueness analysis will necessarily intertwine with overbreadth analysis. 
See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6 ("[A] court should evaluate the 
ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the enactment. To this 
extent, the vagueness of a law affects overbr eadth analysis."). 
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scope as those of ordinary persons. See United States v. 
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 & n.14 (9th Cir. 
1975) (observing that "probationers, like parolees and 
prisoners, properly are subject to limitations from which 
ordinary persons are free" and that "[m]erely because a 
convicted individual's fundamental rights ar e involved 
should not make a probation condition . . . automatically 
suspect"). In evaluating constitutional challenges to 
probation conditions, we have upheld conditions that are 
"directly related to deterring [the offender] and protecting 
the public," even when First Amendment inter ests are at 
stake. United States v. Crandon, 173 F .3d 122, 128 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 138 (1999). The government, 
asserting that in the context of supervised r elease there is 
no "protected" conduct to chill, asks us to apply the more 
stringent standing rules to Loy's vagueness and 
overbreadth challenge, requiring him either to mount his 
challenge in the context of a particular purported violation 
so that we can assess whether the condition is vague or 
overbroad with respect to that violation, or, presumably, to 
demonstrate that the condition is vague in all of its 
applications. But the government fails to r ecognize there 
are important differences between a probationer on 
supervised release and a member of the general public that 
affect the standing analysis. 
 
To begin with, a defendant charged with violating a 
release condition, unlike a defendant char ged with violating 
a statute, does not enjoy "the full panoply of rights" 
normally available in a criminal proceeding. Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). For instance, defendants 
in revocation proceedings face a lower standard of proof, 
see 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e) (permitting revocation if a court 
finds, by a preponderance of evidence, that a condition has 
been violated); a greater range of evidence that may be 
admissible against them, see United States v. Bazzano, 712 
F.2d 826, 829 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam) (no 
exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings); United States 
v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir . 1982) 
(permitting hearsay evidence in revocation proceedings); a 
lack of a jury right, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 
789 (1973); and no right against self-incrimination, see 
United States v. Conte, 99 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1996). The 
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fewer procedural protections available at a revocation 
proceeding, as opposed to a trial, make it far more 
hazardous for a releasee to wait until a condition has been 
enforced in order to test its validity. 
 
Secondly, persons under conditions of supervised r elease 
are presumably more likely to be"prosecuted" for their 
violations--these conditions are, after all, special "laws" 
tailored only to them. Loy, as a felon on supervised release, 
is in far more danger as the peculiar tar get of a "law" 
applicable only to him than he would be as a member of 
the general public mounting a challenge to a law that might 
never be applied to his conduct. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 501 (1961) (plurality opinion) (refusing to entertain, on 
prudential justiciability grounds, a challenge to 
Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives, observing 
that "[d]uring the more than thr ee-quarters of a century 
since [the law's] enactment, a prosecution for its violation 
seems never to have been initiated" except in a single 
instance). 
 
Further, because the condition is unique to Loy, there is 
no likelihood of a general groundswell of support for a 
change in the "law." Therefore, limits on standing that have 
been advanced in cases like United States v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (no "taxpayer standing" to 
challenge a statute mandating that CIA expenditur es be 
kept secret), on the ground that "generalized grievances" 
are more appropriately addressed through the political 
process, are inapplicable to challenges to conditions of 
supervised release. And because the condition is applicable 
only to Loy, there is no chance that an "enforcement policy" 
will provide guidance as to the condition's contours. 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 502. 
 
On a broader level, it should be remember ed that all of 
the justiciability doctrines--standing, ripeness, and 
mootness--stem in part from a desire to allow the other 
branches of government to engage in their nor mal process 
of lawmaking before invoking the judicial power to stop 
such efforts in their tracks. For instance, in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Supreme 
Court explained that the ripeness doctrine in part serves to 
"protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 
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administrative decision has been formalized." Id. at 148. 
Similarly, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 
(1992), the Court held that the citizen-suit pr ovisions of the 
Endangered Species Act, which conferred standing on "any 
person" to sue United States instrumentalities to force 
compliance with the Act, represented an unconstitutional 
attempt by Congress to breach the separation of powers by 
policing the activities of the Executive branch. See id. at 
576-77; see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 503 ("In part [the 
justiciability rules] derive from the fundamental federal and 
tripartite character of our National Government and from 
the role--restricted by its very r esponsibility--of the federal 
courts . . . within that structure."). 
 
In the context of the supervised release, however, the 
condition applicable to a particular prisoner--that is, the 
"law" being challenged--is created by the judiciary, within 
the jurisdictional boundaries set by Congress. No protection 
is accorded other divisions of government when we stay our 
hand; in fact, by doing so, we actively impede the proper 
process of lawmaking. Congress has entrusted the 
responsibility for formulating appr opriate conditions of 
release to the judiciary, and has provided specific statutory 
permission for offenders to obtain appellate review of their 
sentences at 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). Ther efore, judicial review 
of criminal sentences is an integral part of the pr ocess of 
creating these individual "laws," and just as legislation is 
only enacted pursuant to bicameralism and pr esentment, 
see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983), so too 
criminal sentences are formulated in part through the 
appellate process. To refuse to r eview such a condition 
would be to impede this process of judicial lawmaking. 
 
3. Judicial Efficiency 
 
Our position also promotes judicial efficiency. See, e.g., 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wayne County, 760 F .2d 689, 696 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that the ripeness inquiry includes 
considerations of judicial economy); Independent Bankers 
Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(same). Loy is pursuing, as a routine matter , his appellate 
right to challenge a final order of the District Court. We 
review these conditions all the time, and, as a prudential 
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matter, it makes sense to review them at this stage. Just 
last year, we reviewed the conditions of a supervised release 
in United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 138 (1999), and upheld a condition 
prohibiting the defendant access to the inter net after he 
was convicted of receiving child pornography. The 
government's approach merely ensur es multiple 
adjudications as defendants appeal parts of their sentences 
immediately--as, indeed, they must do under United States 
v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1981)--and parts of them 
later on. Cf. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242 
(1980) (ripeness doctrine is intended to prevent "piecemeal 




Thus, (1) we have "case or controversy" jurisdiction; (2) 
the issues are legal ones that we can easily r esolve without 
reference to concrete facts; (3) the defendant will experience 
a hardship if we do not resolve the issues; (4) the 
traditional canons that counsel against hearing these sorts 
of challenges are inapplicable in the context of supervised 
release conditions; and (5) the judicial system has an 
interest in dealing with this case as expeditiously as 
possible, instead of waiting for a distinct appeal of a 
conviction for a violation of the conditions of r elease. 
Therefore, the case is ripe, and we will r each the merits of 
Loy's challenge. 
 
B. The Jurisprudence 
 
The District Court ordered that, as a condition of his 
supervised release, Loy be prohibited"from possessing all 
forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography, in 
order to: (1) protect the children that are victimized in the 
production of child pornography; and (2) deter defendant 
from engaging in additional criminal conduct." Loy claims 
that the District Court's order is unconstitutionally vague, 
because "[t]he term `pornography' lacks a legal definition" 
and "fails to give Mr. Loy notice of which materials he may 
not possess." 
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The constitutional requirement that laws be reasonably 
precise as to the scope of prohibited conduct serves three 
distinct purposes: 
 
       First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
       between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
       laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
       reasonable opportunity to know what is pr ohibited, so 
       that he may act accordingly. . . . Second, . . . [a] vague 
       law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to 
       policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
       hoc and subjective basis. . . . Third . . . where a vague 
       statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First 
       Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the 
       exercise of [those] freedoms. 
 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A statute 
violates due process of law if it "either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also United States v. 
Pungitore et al., 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir. 1990). The 
same principles apply to a condition of supervised r elease. 
See, e.g., United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 
1999) (citing Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 
1972)); LoFranco v. United States Parole Comm'n, 986 F. 
Supp. 796, 810-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 
Courts have long grappled with the problem of generating 
definitions to facilitate the regulation of sexually explicit 
materials. In 1957, the Supreme Court held that"obscene" 
speech is beyond the coverage of the First Amendment. See 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). For years 
afterward, the Court struggled to find a definition of 
"obscenity," see, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 
413 (1966); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Kois 
v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (per curiam), finally 
settling on the now-familiar Miller test, see Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In or der for a work to fall 
outside the scope of the First Amendment, it must: (1) 
taken as a whole, according to community standards, 
appeal to the "prurient interest," (2) depict, "in a patently 
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offensive way," sexual conduct as defined by state law, (3) 
when taken as a whole, lack "serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. "Sexually-oriented 
work is not obscene unless all three elements of the Miller 
test are satisfied." United States v. Various Articles of 
Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 
135 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 
The determination whether a particular work is"obscene" 
under the Miller test is an exacting inquiry. Though 
"community standards" are used to determine whether a 
work is patently offensive, see Smith v. United States, 431 
U.S. 291, 301 (1977), a "reasonable person" standard must 
be used to determine whether a work lacks serious merit, 
see Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-501 (1987). 
"Prurience," for Miller purposes, does not include an appeal 
to "normal, healthy sexual desires," but only includes 
"material whose predominate appeal is to a shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excr etion," Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "Sexual conduct" can include 
"lewd exhibition of the genitals," but a distinction must be 
made between exhibitions that are lewd and those that are 
not lewd, because "nudity alone is not enough to make 
material legally obscene." United States v. V arious Articles of 
Merchandise, Schedule No. 287, 230 F .3d 649, 657 (3d Cir. 
2000) (quoting Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)).3 
And, as we recently held, the Miller test's protection for 
works of serious political value "is broad enough to 
encompass that which might tend to bring about `political 
and social changes.' " Various Articles of Merchandise, 230 
F.3d at 658 (holding that nudist magazines ar e not obscene 
because, inter alia, they "champion nudists' alternative 
lifestyle"). 
 
Many items that would almost certainly fall under the 
general rubric of "pornography" may not be captured by 
Miller's prongs. See, e.g., V arious Articles of Obscene 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Indeed, the panel concluded that the subjects of the nude 
photographs at issue in Various Articles of Merchandise were not "posed 
in a way `suggestive of moral looseness.' " Various Articles of 
Merchandise, 230 F.3d at 657. 
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Merchandise, 709 F.2d at 137 (upholding trial court 
determination that the film Deep Thr oat was not patently 
offensive by the community standards of New York); 
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F .2d 1353, 1373 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that the January 1978 issue of 
Penthouse, but not Playboy, was obscene). In American 
Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F .2d 323 (7th 
Cir. 1985), the court examined a statute that specifically 
defined the term "pornography," noted the disjunction 
between what is "pornographic" and what is "obscene," and 
struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a pr ohibition 
on the former but not the latter. See id. at 334. 
 
As is demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, although 
the scope of the term "obscenity" has been exhaustively 
examined (and even the term "indecency" has been given a 
specific definition by the FCC, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1978)), the term "por nography," 
unmoored from any particular statute, has never received a 
precise legal definition from the Supr eme Court or any 
other federal court of appeals, and remains undefined in 
the federal code.4 The Supr eme Court in Miller used only a 
footnoted dictionary reference for its own definition. See 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n.2 (defining por nography as "a 
description of prostitutes or prostitution" with a secondary 
meaning of "a depiction (as in writing or painting) of 
licentiousness or lewdness: a portrayal of er otic behavior 
designed to cause sexual excitement" (quoting Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary (1969)). Further, in the 
context of Loy's supervised release, in or der to comport 
with First Amendment standards, the prohibition on 
pornography must be narrowly tailor ed to serve the goals of 
advancing Loy's rehabilitation and protecting the public. 
See Part II, supra. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although federal law contains a definition of child pornography, see 
18 U.S.C. S 2256, the release condition imposed here cannot be 
presumed to track that statute, as the condition explicitly prohibits 
"legal adult pornography." Further , the condition does not limit its 
reach 
to visual works, as does federal law. 
 




1. Pornography's Meaning 
 
The word pornography is derived fr om the Greek 
pornographos, which meant "writing of harlots." (Porne = 
harlot and graphos = writing). Accor ding to the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1986), pornography is defined as "1. . . . 
a description of prostitutes or of prostitution, as a matter of 
public hygiene. . . . 2. Description of the life, manners, etc., 
of prostitutes and their patrons; hence, the expression or 
suggestion of obscene or unchaste subjects in literature or 
art; pornographic literature or art." According to Merriam- 
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1999), pornography is "1: 
the depiction of erotic behavior (as in pictur es or writing) 
intended to cause sexual excitement 2: material (as books 
or a photograph) that depicts erotic behavior and is 
intended to cause sexual excitement 3: the depiction of acts 
in a sensational manner so as to arouse a quick intense 
emotional reaction." The Funk & W agnalls New Standard 
Dictionary of the English Language (1941) defines 
pornography as "1. Description of pr ostitutes and of 
prostitution as related to public hygiene. 2. The expression 
or suggestion of the obscene in speaking, writing, etc.; 
licentious art or literature." The W ebster's Third New 
International Dictionary definition was quoted in Part III.B, 
supra. 
 
Though these various definitions are instructive in a 
general way, they clearly lack the greater pr ecision of the 
Miller test for obscenity. Unlike instances of obscenity, we 
could easily set forth numerous examples of books and 
films containing sexually explicit material that we could not 
absolutely say are (or are not) por nographic. One such 
example, as discussed below, might be Playboy , which 
features nudity but not sexual conduct. It is also difficult to 
gauge on which side of the line the film adaptations of 
Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita would fall, or if Edouard Manet's 
Le Dejeuner sur L'Herbe is pornographic (or even some of 
the Calvin Klein advertisements), and we certainly cannot 
know whether the pornography condition is r estricted only 
to visual materials, or whether it encompasses pur e text 
and sound recordings. In Farrell v. Burke, No. 97 CIV. 
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5708(DAB), available in 1998 WL 751695 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 
1998), the district court described a situation in which a 
parole condition prohibiting "por nography" was interpreted 
by a parole officer to apply equally to Playboy and to 
photographs of Michelangelo's David. Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, examining the scope of a 
statutory definition of pornography, observed that it could 
encompass everything "from hard-cor e films to W.B. Yeats's 
poem `Leda and the Swan.' " American Booksellers Ass'n v. 
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir . 1985). Although the 
propriety of affixing the title "por nography" to any of these 
items could foster debate, the debate would r emain 
undecided. Put differently, with r egard to "pornography" 
rather than "obscenity," we do not "know it when we see it." 
 
Additionally, as we observed in United States v. Crandon, 
173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 138 
(1999), to avoid First Amendment infirmity, a probation 
condition must be "narrowly tailored" and "directly related" 
to the goals of protecting the public and pr omoting Loy's 
rehabilitation -- thus, the condition must not extend to all 
arguably pornographic materials, but only to those that fall 
into this subset. Even the government conceded in its 
supplemental brief that it does not know whether Playboy 
is part of this group, which is, in fact, a change from its 
position, taken during oral argument, that Playboy 
absolutely constituted "pornography." 5 Loy, then, can 
hardly be expected to be able to discer n, in advance, which 
materials are prohibited, with no mor e than the 
constitutional standard of permissible r estrictions to guide 
him. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
(2d ed. 1988) S 12-29, at 1031 ("[T]he Constitution does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The government argues that a condition of supervised release is akin 
to a prison regulation, and thus, because por nography is routinely 
forbidden in prisons, such a restriction can be freely applied to Loy. 
This 
contention is patently without merit, as it flatly contradicts the Supreme 
Court's statement in Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (1972), that 
"[t]he liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open 
to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. . . . Though the 
state properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other 
citizens, his condition is very differ ent from that of confinement in a 
prison." Id. at 482. 
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not, in and of itself, provide a bright enough line to guide 
primary conduct, and . . . a law whose reach into protected 
spheres is limited only by the background assurance that 
unconstitutional applications will eventually be set aside is 
a law that will deter too much. . . .") (emphasis removed).6 
 
For all of these reasons, the pornography condition runs 
afoul of the due process values that the vagueness doctrine 
is meant to protect, and, to the extent that Loy is likely to 
avoid materials that are not "dir ectly related" to the goals of 
rehabilitation and deterrence, the condition threatens to 
chill protected conduct, as well. 
 
2. Effects of a Scienter Requir ement 
 
The government advances the intriguing ar gument that 
the condition could be interpreted so as to include a 
salvaging scienter requirement. But this cannot solve the 
problem. To begin with, although pr obation or parole will 
usually not be revoked for unknowing violations of 
conditions of release, unless a scienter r equirement is 
explicitly written into the condition (which is not the case 
here), there is no way to be certain that one will be applied 
during revocation proceedings. This is because release can 
be revoked for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
"fault" of the offender, but instead are more related to 
protection of the public. See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 
830 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If . . . probation's 
purposes have been frustrated, revocation is fair and 
appropriate even if the probationer did not willfully violate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In United States v. Schave, 186 F .3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh 
Circuit avoided a vagueness problem in a condition of supervised release 
that prohibited associations with white supr emacists by construing it to 
encompass only those associations that "r easonably relate[d]" to the 
dangers against which the condition was intended to protect. Id. at 844. 
However appropriate such a measure may have been under the 
circumstances of that case, a similar construction would not save the 
condition here. The condition in Schave was not only more particular 
than Loy's (it prohibited associations with certain well-defined groups), 
but also was part of a long history of "associational" conditions that are 
so common that they have acquired something of a judicial gloss as to 
their scope. See Part IV, infra . 
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his probation conditions."); United States v. McLeod, 608 
F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("A good faith 
attempt to comply with a probation agreement is not a 
controlling factor, but only one of many factors that a 
District Court may consider in the exercise of its discretion 
to revoke probation."). 
 
Even if a scienter requirement wer e to be read into the 
condition, however, this construction would not save it. 
Though in some situations, a scienter requir ement may 
mitigate an otherwise vague statute, see, e.g ., Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 
499 (1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1978), 
such a requirement will not cure all defects for all 
purposes, see, e.g., Cramp v. Boar d of Pub. Instruction of 
Orange County, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961) (invalidating a 
loyalty oath on the ground that, notwithstanding the fact 
that the oath-taker was required only to affirm that he or 
she had never "knowingly" counseled or supported 
Communists, the oath was too vague to be reasonably 
understood); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 
220 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a scienter 
requirement cannot save a statute criminalizing "partial- 
birth abortion" where the definition of such a procedure is, 
in itself, vague); Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 706 F.2d 
782, 789 (7th Cir. 1983) ("A scienter r equirement cannot 
eliminate vagueness . . . if it is satisfied by an`intent' to do 
something that is in itself ambiguous."). Indeed, a contrary 
rule would rob the vagueness doctrine of all of its meaning, 
for legislatures would simply repair otherwise vague 
statutes by inserting the word "knowingly." See Richmond 
Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmor e, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 498 
(E.D. Va. 1999), aff 'd on other gr ounds, 224 F.3d 337 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
 
3. Delegation of Power to the Probation Officer 
 
The government suggests that the term"pornography" is 
cabined by the fact that Loy could check with his pr obation 
officer to gauge its applicability to a particular case. 
However, although there is no question that "[i]n addition to 
the bare words of the probation condition, the probationer 
may be guided by further . . . instructions . . . of the . . . 
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probation officer," United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 
407 (9th Cir. 1982), the sentencing court may not 
wholesaledly "abdicate[ ] its judicial r esponsibility" for 
setting the conditions of release, United States v. 
Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438 (7th Cir . 1995) 
(invalidating an order of restitution wher e the sentencing 
court allowed the probation officer to dictate the manner of 
payment). A condition with no core meaning beyond 
"whatever is necessary for Loy's rehabilitation" cannot be 
cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power 
of interpretation, as this would create one of the very 
problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to 
protect, i.e., the delegation of "basic policy matters to 
policemen . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 
(1972); see LoFranco v. United States Par ole Comm'n, 986 F. 
Supp. 796, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding a par ole condition 
to be unconstitutionally vague because the pr ohibition on 
association with "outlaw motorcycle gangs" delegated 
policymaking power to the parole officer); cf. United States 
v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir . 2000) (invalidating 
a condition requiring probation officer to determine whether 
the defendant should undergo counseling). 7 Though it is 
true that "[c]ondemned to the use of wor ds, we can never 
expect mathematical certainty from our language," 
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, without a more definitive 
standard to guide the probation officer's discretion, there is 
a real danger that the prohibition on por nography may 
ultimately translate to a prohibition on whatever the officer 
personally finds titillating. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down a statute 
punishing assemblages of persons who conducted 
themselves in an "annoying" manner, on the ground that 
though a city may forbid certain forms of antisocial 
conduct, "[i]t cannot constitutionally do so through . . . an 
ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon 
whether or not a policeman is annoyed"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. A similar condition was imposed in this case; however, Loy has not 
raised any challenges to it, and so we need not addr ess the question 
whether this court would follow the Eighth Cir cuit reasoning regarding 
the propriety of conditions that allow the pr obation officer to determine 
whether a defendant is in need of counseling. 
 




To be sure, we are dealing her e with an unusually broad 
condition. We in no way mean to imply that courts may not 
impose restrictions on the consumption of sexually explicit 
materials by persons convicted of sex crimes. Indeed, we do 
not expect that our holding today will greatly diminish a 
district court's discretion in imposing such conditions for 
the simple reason that almost any r estriction upon sexually 
explicit material may well aid in rehabilitation and 
protection of the public. Only in the exceptional case, where 
a ban could apply to any art form that employs nudity, will 
a defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights be 
unconstitutionally circumscribed or chilled. A probationary 
condition is not "narrowly tailored" if it restricts First 
Amendment freedoms without any resulting benefit to 
public safety. Here, the condition could extend not only to 
Playboy magazine, but also to medical textbooks. 
Restricting this entire range of material is simply 
unnecessary to protect the public, and for this reason the 
condition is not "narrowly tailored." 
 
Thus, in Loy's case, to the extent that the condition 
might apply to a wide swath of work ranging fr om serious 
art to ubiquitous advertising, the condition is overly broad 
and violates the First Amendment. To the extent that its 
breadth is unclear, it is unconstitutionally vague. That said, 
there is no question that the District Court could, perfectly 
consonant with the Constitution, restrict Loy's access to 
sexually oriented materials, so long as that r estriction was 
set forth with sufficient clarity and with a nexus to the 
goals of supervised release. Further, the Constitution would 
not forbid a more tightly defined restriction on legal, adult 
pornography, perhaps one that clarified whether it extended 
non-visual materials, or that borrowed applicable language 
from the federal statutory definition of child pornography 
located at 18 U.S.C. S 2256(8).8  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The federal statute reads: 
 
       "child pornography" means any visual depiction, including any 
       photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated 
       image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
       mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where-- 
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In sum, with no guidepost for Loy, the pornography 
prohibition as currently written violates due process by 
failing to provide Loy with adequate notice of what he may 
and may not do, chilling his First Amendment rights in the 
process. The condition "forbids . . . an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 
IV. The Challenge to the Prohibition on 
       Unsupervised Contact with Minors 
 
Conditions of supervised release must be "r easonably 
related" to the goals of deterrence, pr otection of the public, 
and rehabilitation of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.S 3583(d)(1). 
They must also "involve[ ] no gr eater deprivation of liberty 
than is reasonably necessary" to meet these goals, 18 
U.S.C. S 3583(d)(2), and, as stated above, supervised release 
conditions that affect constitutional rights will likely be 
valid if "narrowly tailored and . . . directly related to 
deterring [the offender] and protecting the public." United 
States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
120 S. Ct. 138 (1999); see also United States v. Tolla, 781 
F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[C]onditions that restrict a 
probationer's freedom must be especiallyfine-tuned."). 
 
Loy claims that there is insufficient evidence in the 
record to support the condition barring him from having 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a 
       minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
 
       (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor 
       engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
 
       (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified 
       to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually 
       explicit conduct; or 
 
       (D) such visual depiction is advertised, pr omoted, presented, 
       described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the 
       impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction 
       of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct[.] 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2256(8). 
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any unsupervised contact with minors. He further contends 
that the condition is "not `reasonably r elated' to the 
statutory goals because no evidence was presented that [he] 
ever molested a child." Finally, Loy argues that the 
condition, coupled with the requirement that the 
"supervision" come from someone other than his wife, 
functionally prevents him from bearing and raising children 
of his own, in violation of his fundamental rights to 
procreate and to maintain the integrity of his family. 
 
The District Court's findings in support of the condition 
that Loy have no unsupervised contact with minors r ead as 
follows: 
 
        The Court finds it appropriate to pr ohibit defendant 
       from all unsupervised contact with minors while on 
       supervised release. Although defendant was convicted 
       of possession of child pornography and not of the 
       production of such pornography, the evidence 
       presented to this Court prior to sentencing 
       demonstrates that the defendant has not only a 
       significant knowledge of and interest in child 
       pornographic materials, but also that the defendant 
       himself has been involved in making videos of young 
       girls. Specifically, defendant described to Special Agent 
       Guzy how he had produced videos by hiding a 
       camcorder in a bag and filming up the skirts of girls 
       high school age and younger as they rode escalators at 
       a mall, as well as how he has "hidden" camera 
       videotapes that he made by videotaping through 
       windows. Regardless of whether or not these videos 
       constitute pornography, it is clear to this Court that 
       the defendant, given his interest in child por nography 
       and his efforts to make sexually explicit materials 
       involving children, poses a danger to childr en if left 
       alone with them. 
 
        Accordingly, the Court finds it appr opriate to prohibit 
       defendant from having unsupervised contact with 
       minors. The Court does not mean by imposition of this 
       condition to require that defendant's pr obation officer 
       or another law enforcement official be pr esent 
       whenever defendant is around minors. However , 
       defendant is not to be alone with minors, nor is he to 
 
                                27 
  
       be alone with his wife and any minors. In other wor ds, 
       an adult other than defendant's wife must be pr esent 
       when defendant is in the presence of a minor . This 
       condition of supervised release serves to: (1) protect 
       minors who may come in contact with defendant in 
       that defendant is not likely to attempt to make sexually 
       explicit depictions of them if another adult is pr esent; 
       and (2) deter defendant from engaging in criminal 
       conduct, also because defendant is not likely to 
       attempt to make sexually explicit depictions of children 
       if another adult is present. 
 
In a footnote, the court explained that "[e]vidence presented 
to this Court prior to defendant's sentencing indicated that 
defendant's wife also has an interest in child pornography." 
 
Loy argues that the District Court's findings with respect 
to this condition are not supported by the r ecord. We 
disagree. As the court noted, Loy twice admitted to an 
undercover agent that he secretly filmed up young girls' 
dresses on escalators at the local mall by placing a bag 
containing a hidden video camera at their feet. It may also 
be true that, at the subsequent hearing on his motion to 
suppress, Loy claimed to have fabricated the story. But it is 
not true, as Loy argues, that because the evidence on this 
point is contradictory, the record does not support the 
District Court's finding. 
 
The contradiction is of Loy's own creation. The District 
Court was free to conclude that the self-serving statements 
Loy made before the court were less cr edible than 
statements he made to third parties who he believed shared 
his interests in child pornography. Ther efore, the record 
contained sufficient evidence to support the court's finding 
that Loy had personally made videotapes exploiting minors. 
 
Loy next argues that even if there is sufficient evidence 
that he had secretly filmed up young girls' dresses on mall 
escalators, "that conduct would not be addr essed by the 
condition, because the conduct would not have taken place 
when Mr. Loy was alone with minors." The argument is 
wholly without merit. The fact that Loy was willing to 
exploit minors in public places fully supports a condition 
barring him from being alone with them in private. 
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Loy further contends that the condition is vague in that 
it might conceivably apply to casual or unavoidable contact 
with minors in public places. This argument is one that has 
a long and familiar history in the courts; associational 
conditions placed upon parolees and probationers are 
commonplace and have frequently been challenged as 
overly broad or vague because they potentially extend to 
casual encounters. See 1 Neil P. Cohen, The Law of 
Probation and Parole S 9.11, at 9-19 (2d ed. 1999). At this 
point, it is well established that associational conditions do 
not extend to casual or chance meetings. See, e.g., 
Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 4 (1971) (per curiam) 
(interpreting an associational condition to exclude certain 
casual encounters); Birzon v. King, 469 F .2d 1241, 1243 
(2d Cir. 1972) (same); Cohen, supra,S 9.11, at 9-19 
(observing that associational conditions are fr equently 
challenged, but that courts routinely uphold them and 
interpret them not to apply to chance meetings). We also so 
interpret them. Certainly accidental or unavoidable contact 
with minors in public places is not forbidden by the 
condition; however, should Loy deliberately seek out such 
contacts, they would cease to be "casual" or"unavoidable" 
and would fall within the condition's scope. Thus, in 
accordance with the long line of similar cases, we believe 
that the condition restricting Loy's contact with minors is 
not unconstitutionally vague. 
 
Loy also submits that the record does not support the 
District Court's finding that his wife is also interested in 
child pornography. Consequently, he ar gues, the court 
erroneously structured the condition to pr ohibit him from 
having otherwise unsupervised contact with minor children 
even if his wife is present. The court explained its order 
that Loy must be chaperoned by someone other than his 
wife when in the presence of minors as justified by the fact 
that "[e]vidence presented to this Court prior to defendant's 
sentencing indicated that defendant's wife also has an 
interest in child pornography." This led the court to require 
that "an adult other than defendant's wife must be present 
when defendant is in the presence of a minor ." Although 
the evidence on which the court based its decision is fairly 
tenuous for such a severe restriction, especially considering 
its impact on a third party who has not been charged with 
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any crime, given our deference to the District Court in 
factual matters, it is sufficient.9 
 
Loy's final challenge to the condition is that, although he 
does not currently have children, the condition could 
potentially extend to any children he and his wife may 
subsequently have once he is released fr om prison. If so, 
the condition might deter him from exer cising his 
constitutional right to procreation, see Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and, should he have 
children to whom the condition applies, it would interfere 
with his fundamental right to familial integrity, see Gruenke 
v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir . 2000). 
 
It is well established that, although parents have a 
fundamental right to raise their children, this right can be 
overridden by the state's "compelling inter est" in ensuring 
children's safety. See Croft v. W estmoreland County Children 
& Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, 
convicted pedophiles may, quite legitimately, lose custody of 
their children or have restrictions placed on their parental 
rights. However, where there is insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that children are potentially in danger 
from their parents, the state's inter est cannot be said to be 
"compelling," and thus interference in the family 
relationship is unconstitutional. See id.  at 1126. 
 
Loy, after approximately nine years of marriage, is 
childless; his term of supervised release will last only three 
years. At most, any children he might have upon his 
release would be two years old by the time the term ended. 
There is certainly a legitimate question as to whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The only evidence that Loy's wife is inter ested in child pornography 
is 
that, in his reply to the fake advertisement run by the police, Loy 
responded as "Ray and Maria" and used the word "we" to describe the 
interest in child pornography. However , the transcription of his 
telephone call with the government agent suggests that Ray did not let 
his wife know about his proclivities: "Umm, you know she really don't 
know too much about the very young stuff I got. I mean you know she 
kinda likes the, the couples and solo girls and stuf f. . . . But, like I 
said, 
I kinda keep the actual really young stuf f from her because I don't know 
how she'd handle that. I don't know if she'd fr eak out or not. . . . I 
keep 
that definitely hidden." 
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record would support a finding that Loy represents a threat 
to an infant child of his own. But it is unnecessary to 
decide this question, because we believe it unlikely that the 
District Court intended its condition to extend so far. Given 
the severe intrusion on Loy's family life that would 
otherwise result, we believe that, absent a clearer sign from 
the District Court, the condition should be construed to 
apply only to other people's children, and not to Loy's own. 
If, at some later date, the District Court should come to 
believe that it is necessary for the protection of the public 
or for Loy's rehabilitation to extend the condition to Loy's 
own children, it may consider modifications to the condition 
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e); the 
constitutionality of the restriction can likewise be reviewed 
at that time. We therefore r eject the government's 
suggestion that the condition receive a br oad construction 
now, placing the burden on Loy to petition for a 
modification should he and his wife have childr en before 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the condition 
restricting Loy's contact with minors, but will vacate the 
condition prohibiting Loy from possessing pornography, 
and remand to the District Court for further pr oceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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